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Leidschrift, jaargang 27, nummer 2, september 2012 
In the decades since he left office, historians have come to acknowledge 
Ronald Reagan, for better or worse, as one of America’s emblematic 
presidents. Even liberal historian Sean Willentz concedes that Reagan 
deserves a place among the ‘few leading figures, most of them presidents, 
who (…) have put their political stamp indelibly on their time. They include 
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt – and Ronald Reagan.’1 Reagan earned this place in 
history not just for the policies he enacted as president, but as a symbol of 
the conservative movement which emerged from the fringes of American 
politics in the 1960s and 1970s to dominate the American political scene for 
the past thirty years. Even Obama, while campaigning for the presidency in 
2008, drew historical parallels between himself and the Gipper, who, he 
claimed, ‘changed the trajectory of America in a way that Richard Nixon did 
not and in a way that Bill Clinton did not.’2 
 The conservative movement which carried Reagan to power was no 
ideological monolith, but rather an alliance of various ideological and 
political factions, including libertarians, traditionalists, and anti-Communist 
defense hawks. Opposition to New Deal liberalism, rather a shared ideology, 
united these various factions. In the 1970s a new faction drifted towards, 
and eventually joined, the conservative movement. This small, but relatively 
influential, coterie of academics, public intellectuals, and policy experts had 
previously supported centrist liberalism and the Democratic party, but had 
become increasingly disillusioned with both. Their thinking increasingly 
turned towards conservatism, and by the 1980 campaign many supported 
Reagan. Being newcomers to the conservative movement, these ‘liberals 
mugged by reality’ were soon labeled ‘neoconservatives’. 
 Although the initial move towards the right of many 
neoconservatives resulted from opposition to the counterculture and 
                                                     
1 S. Willentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York 2008) 2. 
2 In an interview with the Reno Gazette on 14 January, 2008. See: 
http://www.rgj.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080115/VIDEO/80115026 
at 18 minutes and 50 seconds. Viewed on: 29 May 2012.  




Johnson’s Great Society programs, they were eventually most vociferous 
and most successful in the arena of foreign policy. They advocated a policy 
of staunch anti-communism, backed up by American military dominance 
and, if necessary, unilateralism. Such a policy was not only at odds with the 
post-Vietnam liberal turn towards non-intervention, but also with the then 
current Republican orthodoxy of realpolitik and détente engineered by Henry 
Kissinger under both Nixon and Ford. Having failed to reform the 
Democratic platform along the lines they envisioned, by the end of the 
1970s many of these erstwhile liberals had aligned themselves with 
conservative foreign policy hawks within the Republican party. 
Institutionalized in the Committee on the Present Danger, this alliance 
supported the candidacy of Ronald Reagan and sought to shape his foreign 
policy agenda. This essay explores the origins of their thinking on foreign 
policy and shows how a relatively small group of traditionally liberal 
intellectuals, increasingly disappointed with the direction of the Democratic 
party, succeeded in leveraging their influence to put a heavy stamp on the 







                                                     
3 Those wishing to explore the origins and ideas of neoconservatism further than 
the outline sketched in this essay are referred first of all to the recent study by Justin 
Vaïsse, the first to document and convincingly tie together the various strands of 
political and intellectual history associated with the ‘neoconservative’ label: J. Vaïsse, 
Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, trans. A. Goldhammer (Cambridge 2011). 
Earlier studies include: P. Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing 
America’s Politics (New York 1979); G. Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, 
Culture, and the War of Ideology (Philadelphia 1993); J. Ehrman, The Rise of 
Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994 (New Haven 1995); J. 
Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York 2008). An 
inside view of neoconservatism can be found in I. Stelzer ed., Neoconservatism 
(London 2004). Some observers have erroneously equated neoconservatism with 
the teachings of University of Chicago political philosopher Leo Strauss, most 
notably S. B. Drury, Leo Strausss and the American Right (Basingstoke 1997); A. 
Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven 2004). For a 
critique of this interpretation see Vaïsse, Neoconservatism, 271-273. 




The Emergence of a Conservative Movement after the Second World 
War 
 
When the neoconservatives began to drift to the right, beginning in the late 
1960s, there already existed a vibrant intellectual and political conservative 
movement in America. In the postwar decades three major currents of 
conservative thought had developed, each opposed in its own way to New 
Deal and Cold War liberalism. While they initially developed more or less 
independently and differed markedly in philosophical outlook, they 
developed sufficient political and organizational cooperation to be 
considered a single coherent movement.4 Traditionalists, the first current 
within the movement, deplored the waning influence of traditional religion 
and morality and the concomitant growth of mass culture and consumerism. 
Libertarians focused primarily on economic issues and particularly 
fulminated against the growing economic influence of the Federal 
government. Anti-communists, the third current within the movement, 
foreshadowed the later neoconservatives in many ways. It similarly included 
many former Marxists and radicals, who considered the struggle with the 
Soviet Union to be the primary purpose of the United States to which all 
other considerations were subservient.5 
 Traditionalists, of whom Russel Kirk was the most prominent 
spokesman, harked back to the ideas of Edmund Burke, the British founder 
of political conservatism. They wished to return to an idealized and 
supposedly simpler society of the past and feared modern innovations, both 
technological, as well as social and political. Instead of the uncertainties of 
                                                     
4 N. Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face. Organizing the American Conservative Movement 1945-
1965 (Copenhagen 2002) 13. 
5 The rise of the conservative movement in the second half of the twentieth century 
has spawned a large amount of literature. For the intellectual roots of the 
movement, G. H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America – Since 1945 
(New York 1979) remains essential reading; A recent, accessible, though somewhat 
superficial introduction to conservatism throughout American history is provided 
in P. Allitt, The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History (New 
Haven 2009). Other important works, besides those quoted above, are: S. 
Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political 
Power (New York 1986); G. Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the 
Conservative Ascendancy in America (Boston 1996); D. T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: 
George Wallace, the Origins of New Conservatism, and the transformation of American Politics 
(New York 1995). 




the modern world, they advocated the sureties of traditional religion, 
morality and social order, which they considered a precondition for 
individual freedom. Traditionalists were cultural critics first and political 
theorists – let alone activists – only second. They fulminated primarily 
against the dangers of modern society and mass culture. While they were 
critical of government interference, particularly where it concerned the 
Federal government and its progressive policies of  New Deal liberalism, 
they did not question the necessity of government as such, as many 
libertarians did. Their Christian philosophy of original sin implied that 
government was necessary to maintain the social order on which their 
idealized society of small, traditional communities under the guidance of an 
almost aristocratic elite was predicated. 6  By the late seventies and early 
eighties, traditionalism had been overshadowed by the New Christian Right, 
which advocated the same traditional morality, but was far more politically 
active and less elitist. 
 Unlike the traditionalists, libertarians had no objections to modern 
capitalism. To the contrary, they believed it to be the ultimate guarantor of 
democracy and individual freedom. Inspired by the works of Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich Hayek, libertarians advocated a minimalist state, and 
especially opposed state intervention in the economy, which they claimed 
would inevitably lead to a totalitarian society. 7  It is debatable whether 
libertarianism in fact qualifies as a conservative philosophy and Hayek 
himself emphasized that he was not, in fact, a conservative. He sharply 
distinguished personal morality, in which he generally agreed with 
traditionalists, and political principles, which did not allow the state to 
enforce any particular morality on its citizens.8 In practical politics, however, 
such subtle distinctions soon became moot, as libertarians and 
traditionalists shared many of the same immediate objectives in their 
opposition to New Deal liberalism. Moreover, the kind of laissez-faire 
economics advocated by libertarians had been the dominant tradition in the 
United States for much of the nineteenth century, thus libertarians might 
have a stronger claim to preserving America's traditions than traditionalists, 
                                                     
6 Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face, 41-42; B. Farmer, American Conservatism: History, Theory 
and Practice (Newcastle 2005) 47-51.  
7 Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 5-13. 
8  F. A. Hayek, ‘Why I Am not a Conservative’ in Gregory L Schneider ed., 
Conservatism in America Since 1930. A Reader (Revised edition 1959; New York 2003) 
180–194, 184. 




who advocated an almost feudal society which had never existed in the New 
World.9 
 Many of the early anti-communists, like many of the later 
neoconservatives, had been Communist sympathizers in the thirties. 
Disillusioned with the Soviet Union under Stalin, however, they 
immediately turned to hard-line conservatism, rather than Cold War 
liberalism. They emphasized the imminent threat, not only of Soviet 
aggression, but perhaps even more strongly of Communist infiltration in 
American society itself. This obsession first surfaced in the Alger Hiss trials 
of the late 1940s, which divided America in those who believed in  
widespread Communist infiltration and those who did not. This culminated 
in the fifties in the McCarthy witch hunts in which hundreds were 
imprisoned and thousands lost their job for supposed ‘un-American’ 
activities. 10  Anti-communism influenced the broader conservative 
movement in two important ways. First it heralded the death knell of 
isolationism, which had dominated the foreign policy thinking of many 
conservatives up until the war. Perhaps even more importantly, anti-
communism, particularly in the immensely polarized atmosphere of 
McCarthyism, provided a rallying point around which the various currents 
of conservatism could rally.11  
 In 1955 an ambitious young journalist founded a magazine that 
would define the conservative movement for decades to come. William F. 
Buckley Jr.’s National Review soon became the touchstone of conservative 
orthodoxy, incorporating elements of traditionalism, libertarianism, and, 
above all, rabid anti-communism. 12  While National Review provided a 
platform for conservatives to explore and debate both their ideas and their 
practical political objectives, few outside the movement took their ideas 
seriously. Barry Goldwater's shattering defeat in 1968 seemed to confirm 
the marginal place of conservatism in America. A little over a decade later, 
however, conservatism would reemerge as a powerful, even dominant, force 
in American political thought as well as American policy. Neoconservatives 
                                                     
9 Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face, 46-50. 
10 Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 97-104; Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face, 59-60; E. 
Schrecker, The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents (Boston 2002) 63-64. 
11 Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 123-124, 127-128. 
12 J. Micklethwait and A. Woolridge, The Right Nation: Why America Is Different 
(London 2004) 50-51. 




would play an important role in broadening the appeal of conservatism and 
legitimizing many of its claims. 
 
 
Domestic Debates and The Public Interest 
 
The first generation of neoconservatives emerged from the milieu of the 
New York Intellectuals. This was a group of public intellectuals, mostly of 
Eastern European and Jewish descent who, prior to the Second World War, 
espoused radical leftist, albeit anti-Stalinist, politics. After the war, they 
mostly abandoned radicalism and supported the ‘vital center’ liberalism that 
dominated American politics through the 1960s and early 1970s.13 By the 
late 1960s and throughout the 1970s an increasing number of these 
intellectuals became disillusioned with the results of liberal policies and the 
perceived drift to the left of the Democratic party. These included respected 
social scientists such as Daniel Bell and Nathan Glazer, and policy experts, 
such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who increasingly criticized the 
inefficiencies of the welfare state and particularly opposed policies 
specifically supporting African Americans and other minorities, such as 
positive discrimination and forced integration of schools through busing. 
 These neoconservatives, initially, were not directly involved in 
political action. Instead, they developed and spread their ideas through 
periodical publications. Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer published the 
sociological quarterly The Public Interest, which provided a platform for the 
academic substantiation of many neoconservative ideas. Centered around a 
newly assertive Americanism – born of anti-anti-Americanism, a reaction to 
the protest movements of the sixties – they developed a set of ‘amorphous 
and ambiguous’ ideas and concepts in their critique of liberalism, such as 
‘status anxiety’, the ‘new class’, the ‘end of ideology’, and, a perennial 
favorite, the ‘law of unintended consequences’. Their greatest success, 
however, lay not in the development of any groundbreaking theory, but in 
forcing ‘the decisive breach in the defenses of the liberal orthodoxy, 
                                                     
13 The term ‘vital center’ was coined by A. Schlesinger, The Vital Center: The Politics of 
Freedom (Cambridge 1963). On the New York Intellectuals see: M. van Rossem, Het 
radicale temperament: de dubbele politieke bekering van een generatie Amerikaanse intellectuelen, 
1934-1953 (Utrecht 1983); A. Bloom, Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals and 
Their World (New York 1986); A. M. Wald, The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and 
Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s (Chapel Hill 1987). 




because they succeeded in stripping liberalism in the public mind of its 
monopoly of expertise.’14  
 By the mid 1970s The Public Interest had moved so far to the right, that 
it carried articles by Jude Wanniski, who popularized supply side economics 
and David Stockman, who would be instrumental in implementing policies 
based on it under Reagan. Wanninsky and other supply-siders argued that 
lowering taxes would in fact increase revenue, by increasing economic 
growth and reducing tax evasion. Instead of their earlier critique of the 
mainstream social science and its often liberal leaning policy implications, 
the editors now embraced the most radical conservative economic theory 
around.15 
 If The Public Interest provided the intellectual ammunition for the 
neoconservative movement’s attack on liberalism, Commentary magazine 
would come to lead the assault. In his first decade or so as editor of the 
American Jewish Committee’s monthly publication, Norman Podhoretz – 
one of the youngest of the New York Intellectuals – produced a magazine 
with a distinctly liberal bent. He even published parts of Paul Goodman’s 
counter culture classic Growing Up Absurd, which he praised for making ‘the 
entire enterprise of radical social criticism seem intellectually viable once 
again.’ 16  By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, Podhoretz had 
followed his friend Kristol into the neoconservative camp.  
 The Public interest devoted its pages to exploring abstract ideas from 
the realms of social science and public policy. Commentary, on the other hand, 
directly engaged hot-button political issues of the day. Some of these issues 
melded with the critique on the liberal welfare state and social planning 
expounded in The Public Interest. The latter, however, was almost exclusively 
devoted to such domestic issues, while Podhoretz also regularly published 
on issues relating to foreign policy. Reflecting the Jewish background of the 
magazine, of many of its contributors, and of Podhoretz himself, the 
                                                     
14 Hodgson, World Turned Right Side Up, 130, 131-157; Vaïsse, Neoconservatism, 55, 75. 
15 D. Stockman, ‘The social pork barrel’, The Public Interest 39 (Spring 1975) 3-30; J. 
Wanninsky, ‘The Mundell-Laffer Hypothesis – a new view of the world economy’, 
The Public Interest 39 (Spring 1975). 31-52; J. Wanninsky, ‘Taxes, revenues, and the 
“Laffer curve”’, The Public Interest 50 (Winter 1978) 3-16. 
16 P. Goodman, ‘Youth in Organized Society: Growing Up in America’, Commentary 
29 (1960) 95-107; P. Goodman, ‘The Calling of American Youth’, Commentary 29 
(1960) 217-229; P. Goodman, ‘In Search of Community’, Commentary 29 (1960) 315-
323; N. Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir (New York 1979) 24. 




magazine advocated a staunch, unwavering and unconditional support for 
Israel, particularly following the Six-Day War of June 1967.17 Soon, however, 
he expanded the scope of issues to include an equally staunch, unwavering, 
and unconditional anti-communism and opposition to the Soviet Union. 
 
 
NSC 68: The Birth of Militant Containment 
 
To fully understand the intellectual and political background of the 
neoconservatives’ militant anti-Communism, we must first take a step back 
and review the broad developments of American foreign policy, and the 
ideas underlying it, since the end of World War II. Soon after the end of the 
war, George F. Kennan, a state department expert on the Soviet Union 
stationed in Moscow, articulated the doctrine of containment. The central 
premise of this doctrine was that Soviet power was to ‘be contained by the 
adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly 
shifting geographical and political points.’ By simultaneously supporting the 
establishment and economic development of democracies in Europe and 
elsewhere, Moscow would come under increasing strain, resulting in ‘either 
the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.’18 
 Kennan’s conception of containment emphasized diplomacy and 
economic development with a limited military focus on those places which 
were of strategic significance. Such a policy, he reminded his readers, ‘has 
nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or 
superfluous gestures of outward ‘toughness’.19 The form of containment 
that would eventually become US policy, however, significantly differed 
from this approach. In 1950, Paul Nitze, who succeeded Kennan as director 
of the Policy Planning Staff, produced a policy paper known as NSC 68, 
which would serve as the basic underpinning of American foreign policy for 
                                                     
17 M. Peretz, ‘The American Left & Israel’, Commentary 44.5 (November 1967) 27-34; 
N. Podhoretz, ‘is it Good for the Jews?’, Commentary 53.2 (1972) 7-14; N. Podhoretz, 
‘A Certain Anxiety’, Commentary 52.2 (1971) 4-10. 
18 Kennan initially expounded his containment doctrine in what became known as 
‘The Long Telegram’ (February 1946). The citation, however, are from the article 
published anonymously in Foreign Affairs: ‘X’ [George Kennan], ‘The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947) 566-582: 576, 582. 
19 Ibidem, 575. Kennan reiterated and emphasized this point in G. F. Kennan, 
Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston 1972) 354-367, particularly 358-359. 




the next two decades. While also advocating containment, Nitze and his 
team gave very different meaning to the term. Where Kennan had 
emphasized internal Soviet weaknesses and counseled patience, Nitze 
warned that: 
 
The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or 
destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They 
are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience 
and resolution this Government [...] must now take new and fateful 
decisions.20 
 
Perceiving a far greater threat posed by the USSR, Nitze’s team concluded 
that the United States must pursue a ‘rapid build-up of political, economic, 
and military strength.’ This implied a manifold increase in defense spending. 
In part as a result of NSC 68, and boosted by the Korean War, the 1951 
budget for the military more than tripled, from 13.5 to 48.2 billion. 21 
Although the discussion of political and economic strength is reminiscent of 
Kennan, in NSC 68 it is military strength which takes center stage. The 
economic and political component deals mainly with financing and 
politically justifying the increased military expenditures called for.22  
 NSC 68 differed from Kennan’s conception not only in its increased 
emphasis on military superiority, but also by extending the concept of 
American interests. It would no longer be enough to defend selected strong 
points and areas of vital interest, but instead any expansion of Communist 
interest was to be considered equally threatening: 
 
In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, 
it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin’s 
design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and 
less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interest, the 
responsibility of world leadership.23 
                                                     
20 ‘NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 
1950). A Report to the President Pursuant to the President’s Directive of January 
31, 1950’ reprinted in E. R. May ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 
(New York 1993) 23-81: 26. 
21  J. Sanders, Peddler of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of 
Containment (Boston 1983) 56. 
22 ‘NSC 68’, 71-76. 
23 Ibidem, 29 





As one analyst of NSC 68 has noted, such an emphasis on a ‘perimeter 
defense, with all points along the perimeter considered of equal 
importance,’ implied a ‘transfer to the Russians [of] control over what 
United States interests were at any given point.’24 
 
 
From Ideas to Policy: Coalition for Democratic Majority and Team B 
 
Astute as such criticism appears in retrospect, at the time few objected to 
the policies put forward in NSC 68, and they would serve as the 
groundwork for the containment consensus that carried American foreign 
policy through the fifties and far into the sixties, until it was discredited by 
America’s failure in Vietnam. In response to this failure and a perceived 
decline of American power vis-à-vis the Soviets, Nixon and Kissinger 
devised a new strategic concept known as détente. 25  Détente aimed to 
defuse tensions and normalize relations between the superpowers, including 
negotiated limitations on nuclear arms. Conservative defense hawks, who 
had found even containment too soft, naturally opposed this new 
orientation. More significantly, so did some hawkish Democrats, who 
opposed bilateral arms negotiations, as well as the underlying assumption of 
détente that the Soviet Union might be treated as an equal partner. 
 The most prominent leader of this faction within the Democratic 
party was Washington Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson.26 Although Jackson 
himself would always remain loyal to his party, many of his supporters and 
staff from the seventies ended up as neoconservative converts to the 
Reagan camp. Few, however, had yet abandoned the party in 1976 and 
united in the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), most 
neoconservatives threw their support behind Jackson in that year’s 
presidential primary. The CDM was the first initiative in which the 
                                                     
24 ‘Gaddis’s Commentary’ in: May, American Cold War Strategy, 141-146: 142, 145. 
25 On détente see, among many others, R. L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: 
American-Soviet Relations form Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C. 1994); J. Suri, Power 
and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge 2003); J. M. Hanhimäki, 
The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford 2004); J. L. 
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy 
During the Cold War (New York 2005) chapter 9. 
26 R. G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson. A Life in Politics (Seattle 2000). 




neoconservatives moved beyond the realms of publishing and ideas and 
sought to gain direct political influence. Founded in 1972 in response to 
McGovern’s candidacy, the coalition sought to move the party towards the 
political center. While its original manifesto concentrated on domestic 
issues and a rebuke of ‘new politics’, by 1974 the focus had moved to 
foreign policy, embodied in a report published by a CDM task force led by 
Eugene V. Rostow (who had served in foreign policy positions under 
Truman and Johnson) and which also included Podhoretz, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, and Samuel P. Huntington. The report conceded détente – 
meaning ‘a state of genuine peace with the Soviet Union’ – to be a laudable 
goal for American foreign policy. Under Nixon, however, such a policy had 
failed utterly ‘The pressure of Soviet policy, backed by growing and most 
advanced air, naval, and conventional army forces, as well as by formidable 
nuclear arms, is strongly felt (…).’27 As we shall see, this emphasis on the 
Soviet threat and concomitant American decline would soon become a 
staple of neoconservative propaganda.  
 Not Jackson, however, but Jimmy Carter would go on to win the 
Democratic nomination and subsequently the presidency. The 
neoconservatives intensely distrusted Carter’s foreign policy, particularly his 
criticism of human rights abuses by American allies and unwillingness to 
project American power in world affairs. Walter Lacquer evaluated Carter’s 
performance for Commentary one year into his presidency, concluding not 
only that ‘the balance sheet on human rights after Carter’s first year is thus 
far negative’ but more fundamentally that ‘it is difficult to discern any clear 
idea of America’s role in world affairs (…) there is a great deal of confusion 
as to what America is legitimately entitled to do in defense of its vital 
interests.’28 
 Such opposition received a boost when the report of Team B leaked 
to the press shortly after Carter’s election. Team B was a group of 
‘independent’ experts authorized by then head of the CIA George H. W. 
Bush to analyze classified intelligence in order to ‘determine whether a good 
case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in fact, more 
                                                     
27 E. V. Rostow et al., ‘The Quest for Détente: A Statement by the Foreign Policy 
Task Force of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, July 31, 1974’: 
http://neoconservatism.vaisse.net/doku.php?id=the_quest_for_detente. Viewed 
on: 29 May 2012. 
28 W. Laqueur, ‘The World and President Carter’, Commentary 65.2 (February 1978) 
56-63: 57, 63. 




ambitious and therefore implicitly more threatening to U.S. security than 
they appear’ to the traditional CIA analysts.29 Neoconservatives and their 
sympathizers dominated its personnel. The team leader was Richard Pipes, a 
hard line anti-Communist professor of Russian history at Harvard, adviser 
to Henry Jackson and soon to be regular contributor to Commentary. It also 
included NSC 68 author Nitze and another Jackson protégée, Paul 
Wolfowitz. Neoconservatives had long harped on the threat posed to 
America by Communism and the Soviet Union and Team B not surprisingly 
concluded that intelligence reports through 1975 ‘substantially misperceived 
the motivations behind Soviet strategic programs, and thereby tended 
consistently to underestimate their intensity, scope, and implicit threat.’30 
 Although Team B’s findings have since been criticized, 
neoconservatives at the time (and since) found in them a welcome 
substantiation for the aggressive foreign policy they had always advocated. 
In July of 1977 Commentary published a long article by Pipes, in which he 
faulted ‘the refusal of America’s “sophisticated” elite to accept the reality of 
a Soviet threat.’ Soviet nuclear strategy was not simply aimed at mutual 
deterrence and a maintenance of the status quo, but, if they felt an 
opportunity presented itself, at fighting and winning an nuclear war. He 
insisted that the only effective deterrence to this threat lay in a numerical 




Kirkpatrick’s Double Standards 
 
Neoconservatives continued to critique Carter’s foreign policy, culminating 
in 1979 in the most famous and influential article ever to appear in 
Commentary. CDM co-founder and Jackson supporter Kirkpatrick, a 
Georgetown University professor of government was a Scoop Jackson 
Democrat, who had served on the 1976 party platform committee. She 
                                                     
29 ‘Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis. Soviet Strategic 
Objectives, An Alternative View. Report of Team “B” December 1976,’ 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/nitze10.pdf, iii,. Viewed 
on: 29 May, 2012. 
30 Ibidem, 1. 
31 R. Pipes, ‘Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War’, 
Commentary 64.1 (July 1977) 21-34. 




shared the neoconservatives’ views on foreign policy and her article 
‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’ would establish her as the 
movements central ideologue and catapult her into the Republican party, 
first as a foreign policy adviser to candidate Reagan and later as his 
ambassador to the United Nations. 
 While Laqueur had seen some successes mixed with failures and 
advocated a critical wait-and-see attitude, Kirkpatrick’s article opened on a 
damningly critical note: ‘The failure of the Carter administration’s foreign 
policy is now clear to everyone except its architects, and even they must 
entertain private doubts, from time to time (...).’ Kirkpatrick particularly 
blamed Carter for recent events in Iran and Nicaragua, where regimes 
closely allied to America had been overthrown by revolutionary forces 
opposed to the United States, and, in the case of Nicaragua, supported by 
the Soviet Union. She placed the blame for these developments on the 
Carter administration, which refused to unconditionally support its 
authoritarian allies, instead urging them to reform and democratize. This 
was, Kirkpatrick argued, typical of liberal hypocrisy, which criticized human 
rights abuses by traditional autocracies, while ignoring such abuses in 
Communist countries – the double standards referred to in the title. As a 
result, the United States has ‘assisted the coming to power of new regimes 
in which ordinary people enjoy fewer freedoms and less personal security 
than under the previous autocracy – regimes, moreover, hostile to American 
interests and policies.’ Such ‘traditional autocracies’ would have at least the 
potential to gradually develop towards democracy, while there ‘is no 
instance of a revolutionary “socialist” or Communist society being 
democratized.’ Supporting such traditional autocracies was not only in the 
best interest of the United States, but also of the local population, since ‘the 
miseries of traditional life are familiar, [therefore] they are bearable to 
ordinary people who, growing up in the society, learn to cope.’32 
 Kirkpatrick’s essay thrilled conservatives and neoconservatives alike. 
She presented a cohesive, well reasoned argument, embedded in current 
theories on modernization and international politics. Exactly the kind of 
intellectual justification which the conservative movement often had lacked. 
As one commentator would write a few years later, she had ‘brilliantly 
broken the mold that had settled around liberal thinking on dictatorships 
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and human rights.’ 33  Others, including Carter’s former Coordinator of 
Security Planning, Samuel Huntington, quickly echoed Kirkpatrick’s 
argument that, ‘if it is a choice between right-wing and left-wing 
dictatorships there are (…) good reasons in terms of liberty to prefer the 
former to the latter.’34 
 
 
Intellectuals become Activists: The Committee on the Present 
Danger and the 1980 Elections 
 
By the time Kirkpatrick wrote her essay, she and other neoconservatives no 
longer limited themselves to a battle of ideas. Moving beyond the intraparty 
organization of the CDM, a number of the most prominent 
neoconservatives, including Norman Podhoretz, Nathan Glazer, Seymour 
Martin Lipset, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Midge Decter, had helped found a 
lobbying organization, called the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 
which sought to promote the militant foreign policy and hard-line anti-
communism favored by the neoconservatives. Founding member of the 
committee also included NSC 68 architect Paul Nitze, former Assistant 
Secretary of State Eugene Rostow, AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer Lane 
Kirkland, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor, 
and well over a hundred others from leading positions in business, academia, 
publishing, civil service, and the military. Over the next few years a number 
of other prominent neoconservatives joined the organization, including 
Richard Pipes, Michael Novak, and Richard Perle (another Scoop Jackson 
protégée). The CPD, however, was not just a club of dissatisfied Democrats. 
Numerous conservatives and long-time Republicans who shared the 
neoconservatives’ views on foreign policy joined, including Donald 
Rumsfeld, William J. Casey, Richard V. Allen, George P. Schultz, and 
Ronald Reagan. 
 The CPD was a reincarnation of an earlier organization of the same 
name founded in the early fifties to help build public support for the 
militant containment policies of NSC 68. The original CPD thus played a 
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crucial role in forging the bipartisan containment consensus.35 The CPD of 
the late 1970s aimed to restore this consensus, which had been shattered by 
the Vietnam War and the subsequent policy of détente. The opening words 
of the committee’s first policy statement echoed the alarmist views of the 
Team B report, the CDM task force, and many neoconservative publicists: 
‘Our country is in a period of danger, and the danger is increasing. Unless 
decisive steps are taken to alert the nation, and to change the course of its 
policy, our economic and military capacity will become inadequate to assure 
peace with security.’ The most important threat remained the Soviet 
Union’s ‘drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup.’ 
This threat could only be met through significantly increased military 
spending, they argued, as the original CPD had successful done in the fifties:   
 
For the United States to be free, secure and influential, higher levels 
of spending are now required for our ready land, sea, and air forces, 
our strategic deterrent, and, above all, the continuing modernization 
of those forces through research and development. 
 
The alternative was for the United States to  
 
find [itself] isolated in a hostile world, facing the unremitting 
pressures of Soviet policy backed by an overwhelming 
preponderance of power. Our national survival itself would be in 
peril, and we should face, one after another, bitter choices between 
war and acquiescence under pressure.36 
 
The CPD differed crucially from the earlier CDM, in that it was bipartisan. 
The CPD could thus exert greater political leverage, by pursuing its stated 
policy goals, regardless of partisan affiliations. A few months after its 
formation, Reagan joined the CPD, and its network would be instrumental 
in his gaining the support of many hawkish Democrats for his 1980 election 
campaign. Richard Allen, the only supporter of Reagan’s 1976 primary bid 
to join CPD, was the crucial link in forging this connection. He actively 
recruited CPD members, particularly Democrats, to join Reagan’s campaign 
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team as advisers on foreign policy. 37  One prominent Democratic CPD 
member initially resisted the lure of Reagan and the Republican party. As 
late as the fall of 1979 Kirkpatrick published an article entitled ‘Why We 
Don’t Become Republicans’, citing both ideological and personal reasons 
for refusing to switch a life long alliance. Only a personal and flattering 
letter from Reagan himself, who had read her Commentary article changed 
her mind and she soon switched party allegiance, earning a post as U.N. 





How can we measure the success of the neoconservatives as a lobby in the 
1980 elections? Although impossible to gauge accurately, it is rather unlikely 
they had a decisive electoral impact, considering the nearly ten percentage 
point advantage Reagan had over Carter and the relative obscurity for most 
voters of the issues they focused on. The neoconservatives most crucial 
achievement, instead, was to provide bipartisan respectability and 
intellectual gravitas to hawkish foreign policy principals before associated 
with the right-wing fringe of American politics. As Podhoretz himself 
claimed, a year-and-a-half after Reagan’s election,  
 
if the grip of the conventional liberal wisdom and the leftist 
orthodoxies in the world of ideas had not been loosened by the 
criticisms of the neo-conservatives (...) Ronald Reagan would in all 
probability have been unable to win over the traditionally 
Democratic constituencies (...) whose support swept him into the 
White House.39 
 
If the importance of the neoconservative in getting Reagan elected is 
difficult to determine, the importance of his election for the 
neoconservatives is quite clear. Reagan appointed dozens of CPD members 
to foreign policy posts in his administration. Partisan politics being what it 
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is, the most important appointments naturally went to long-time 
Republicans, such as Allen (National Security Adviser) William J. Casey 
(CIA director), George P. Schultz (Secretary of State), and John F. Lehman 
(Secretary of the Navy). Former Democrats, however, were rewarded for 
their support during the campaign. Only Kirkpatrick received a cabinet level 
appointment, but others filled posts crucial to the neoconservative program 
of militant anti-Communism. These included Pipes (Director Soviet Affairs 
at the NSC), Rostow (Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), 
Perle (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy), 
Nitze (Chief Negotiator to Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Talks), and 
Max Kampelman (Chairman US delegation to CSCE).40 
 Political influence, however, did not automatically lead to the 
adoption of a neoconservative policy on all fronts by Reagan. Once in 
power, neoconservatives inevitably had to make compromises and these 
compromises led to tensions within the neoconservative ranks. Within the 
administration, Rostow and Nitze supported a negotiated agreement on 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (Euromissiles), to the chagrin of hardliners 
such as Perle, who adamantly opposed all arms negotiations. 41 
Neoconservatives outside of the administration maintained an even more 
rigid stance. Podhoretz, in the 1982 article cited above, praises Reagan for 
his rearmament policies, but goes on to severely criticize him for not taking 
more decisive and forceful action in the Middle East and Central America, 
not coincidentally the two regions Kirkpatrick had focused on in 
‘Dictatorships and Double Standards.’42 Despite increasing evidence of the 
disintegration of Soviet power over the 1980s many neoconservative 
intellectuals writing in Commentary continued (as late as 1989) to insist on the 
relative decline of American power and the imminent threat of Soviet 
power. 43  By refusing to come to terms with these new realities 
neoconservatism rapidly declined as an intellectual force, even as many of 
its adherents remained powerful actors on the political stage. 
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